Transcranial magnetic stimulation can cause measurable effects on neural activity and behavioral performance in healthy volunteers. In addition, TMS is increasingly used in clinical practice for treating various neuropsychiatric disorders. Unfortunately, TMS-induced effects show large intra- and inter-subject variability, hindering its reliability, and efficacy. One possible source of this variability may be the spontaneous fluctuations of neuronal oscillations. We present recent studies using multimodal TMS including TMS-EMG, TMS-tACS, and concurrent TMS-EEG-fMRI, to evaluate how individual oscillatory brain state affects TMS signal (...) propagation within targeted networks. We demonstrate how the spontaneous oscillatory state at the time of TMS influences both immediate and longer-lasting TMS effects. These findings indicate that at least part of the variability in TMS efficacy may be attributable to the current practice of ignoring oscillatory fluctuations during TMS. Ignoring this state-dependent spread of activity may cause great individual variability which so far is poorly understood and has proven impossible to control. We therefore also compare two technical solutions to directly account for oscillatory state during TMS, namely, to use tACS to externally control these oscillatory states and then apply TMS at the optimal brain state, or oscillatory state-triggered TMS. The described multimodal TMS approaches are paramount for establishing more robust TMS effects, and to allow enhanced control over the individual outcome of TMS interventions aimed at modulating information flow in the brain to achieve desirable changes in cognition, mood, and behavior. (shrink)

Irreplicability is framed as crisis, blamed on sloppy science motivated by perverse stimuli in research. Structural changes to the organization of science, targeting sloppy science (e.g., open data, pre‐registration), are proposed to prevent irreplicability. While there is an unquestionable link between sloppy science and failures to replicate/reproduce scientific studies, they are currently conflated. This position can be understood as a result of the erosion of the role of theory in science. The history, sociology, and philosophy of science reveal alternative explanations (...) for irreplicability to show it is part of proper, informative and valuable science. Irreplicability need not equate research waste. Sloppy science is the problem, also when results do replicate. Hence, the solution should focus on opposing sloppy research. (shrink)

On many occasions, individuals are able to coordinate their actions. The first empirical evidence to this effect has been described by Schelling (1960) in an informal experiment. His results were corroborated many years later by Mehta et al. (1994a,b) and Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997). From the point of view of mainstream game theory, the success of individuals in coordinating their actions is something of a mystery. If there are two or more strict Nash equilibria, mainstream game theory has no means (...) of explaining why people tend to choose their part of one and the same equilibrium. Textbooks (see, e.g., Rasmusen, 1989 and Kreps, 1990) refer to the fact that players may use focal points (see Schelling (1960)) or social conventions (see Lewis (1969)). Both notions cannot easily be incorporated into mainstream game theory, however. The notion of social conventions has recently been extensively studied in the context of evolutionary game theory where a population of agents interacts with each other. The central focus of this paper, however, is on situations where a few players play a game only once and I study how they may coordinate their actions. (shrink)

In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, mainly his pluriverse of (...) possible worlds and its many applications, that systematicity was due to the influence of his teacher Quine, who really was an heir to Russell. Drawing upon Lewis’s posthumous papers and his correspondence as well as the published record, we show that Lewis’s non- Quinean influences, including G.E. Moore and D.M. Armstrong, led Lewis to an anti- systematic methodology which leaves each philosopher’s views and starting points to his or her own personal conscience. (shrink)

The rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and Anaximenes, in discussing the introduction of a speech, recognize that a speaker may encounter prejudice on the part of his audience for some reason or other; perhaps because of his own character or reputation, or because of the nature of the case he is pleading, or because his opponent has already won their approval. Anaximenes describes a speaker in this situation as and he and Aristotle give advice on countering such if they have arisen (...) . Rather more than two centuries later we find the early Latin rhetoricians expounding the doctrine of insinuatio for dealing with such a situation; they distinguish between principium, the ordinary direct introduction, and insinuatio, the ‘subtle approach’. (shrink)